CloakPipe documentation
Model proposes. Code disposes. An agent’s model decides which tool to call and with what arguments. CloakPipe sits between the agent and its tools, checks every call against rules you wrote down, and only lets through the calls those rules allow. It runs on your machines as one binary, cloakpipe, and is MIT-licensed.
CloakPipe does three jobs at the action boundary, the point where a model’s text becomes a side effect:
- Stop a tool call that is out of contract: an undeclared tool, an undeclared argument, an email to an address the task never mentioned, a refund over the limit.
- Ask a human when policy says a call needs approval, and let through only the exact call that was approved.
- Leave evidence: a signed, hash-chained entry for every decision, anchored to outside timestamping services, that an auditor can check offline without trusting you.
Declare, enforce, prove
| Step | What you do | What CloakPipe does |
|---|---|---|
| Declare | Write one cloakpipe.manifest.yaml: the tools the agent may call, what each argument may hold, which calls have side effects and which need approval. Optionally point it at a Cedar policy for rate limits and tiers. |
Loads and checks it at start-up, and refuses to start on a bad rule. See Manifest reference and Policy. |
| Enforce | Run your MCP server behind cloakpipe mcp-proxy. |
Checks each tools/call in order (contract, Cedar, approval, side-effect state) and forwards it or answers with a JSON-RPC error. See MCP tool gate. |
| Prove | Export the ledger with cloakpipe ledger export. |
Every decision is a signed ledger entry; epochs are anchored with an RFC 3161 timestamp authority and Sigstore Rekor; cloakpipe verify checks a pack offline. See Evidence & verification. |
The quick start runs all three on a sample support agent in a few minutes. In that example, a prompt-injected send_email to attacker@evil.example is refused as scope_mismatch, and a call to an undeclared export_customers tool is refused as undeclared_tool.
Release status
The latest release is v0.14.0 (29 October 2026): a GitHub release, the cloakpipe-cli 0.14.0 package on crates.io, and the Docker image ghcr.io/rohansx/cloakpipe:0.14.0, which runs the gate by default. The quick start shows the install. Every page labels what it describes:
- v0.11 since v0.11, and still in v0.14.0.
- v0.12 since v0.12, and still in v0.14.0.
- v0.13 since v0.13, and still in v0.14.0.
- v0.14 new in v0.14.0: not in the 0.13.0 crates or the 0.13.0 image.
- Roadmap planned, not built.
| Capability | Status |
|---|---|
cloakpipe mcp-proxy over stdio, one upstream MCP server |
v0.11 |
Signed approval receipts bound to one exact call (cloakpipe approve) |
v0.11 |
Side-effect tracking with reconcile-before-retry (--operations-db, cloakpipe operations) |
v0.11 |
The single-file cloakpipe.manifest.yaml, closed by default, with one_of_context, idempotency_key and conditional approval |
v0.12 |
Cedar policies with persistent call counters and @approval |
v0.12 |
A signed decision ledger written by default, shadow mode (--mode shadow) |
v0.12 |
Scheduled anchoring epochs, cloakpipe ledger export and cloakpipe verify |
v0.12 |
| A lean default binary, MIT-only licence | v0.12 |
MCP over HTTP (Streamable HTTP) on both sides of the gate: --listen for agents, --upstream-url for servers |
v0.13 |
One gate in front of several stdio servers (--server), with tools/list pinning (cloakpipe tools pin, --tools-lock) and drift detection |
v0.13 |
| Gate events as signed webhooks (generic, Slack, Discord), OpenTelemetry spans and a JSONL log. See Alerts & events | v0.13 |
| The Docker image runs the gate over HTTP by default. See Docker | v0.13 |
Approvals through a broker you run: approval.show, --approvals-url, cloakpipe approvals keys, approval_denied, an open signed protocol, receipts verified locally. See Approvals |
v0.14 |
| Tool-call checks in the OpenAI/Anthropic-compatible LLM proxy | Roadmap |
| Replay of a candidate manifest; approve with an edit | Roadmap |
| A hosted plane on top of the events (grouped alerts, routing, approval cards in Slack, digests): CloakPipe Cloud, a hosted broker, is coming soon and not deployed yet. Nothing is sent to a hosted service unless you configure a webhook or a broker | Roadmap |
v0.11.0 configured the gate with the older pair of files, an AgentRelease plus a ToolContract. v0.12.0, v0.13.0 and v0.14.0 still read that pair, with a deprecation warning.
What it is not
- Not a sandbox. It decides whether a tool call goes through. It does not contain a tool server that is already running, or code the agent runs some other way.
- Not a prompt filter or jailbreak detector. It does not read the model’s reasoning. It checks the call the model proposes against rules that do not depend on the model.
- Not observability. Traces show what happened afterwards. The gate decides before the call happens and records why. Its optional OpenTelemetry spans v0.13 describe the gate’s own decisions, not the agent’s work.
- Not identity or access management. It does not issue or broker credentials. It decides what a release may do with the tools it already has.
- Not a hosted service. The gate runs on your machines and calls no CloakPipe service. The only outside calls are the ones you turn on: anchoring sends a signed epoch head (hashes, no arguments) to the timestamp authority and Rekor log you choose, webhooks send events, and an approval broker you choose gets approval requests with only the arguments the manifest lists in
approval.show. Enforcement never depends on any of them. Hosted alerts and approvals are not built; if you want them, tell us on the waitlist.
The threat model is specific about what the gate does and does not protect against.
Open source
Everything on these pages is in rohansx/cloakpipe under the MIT licence. There is no paid tier of the gate. The same binary also has a PII transform (mcp-proxy --transform pii, and an OpenAI/Anthropic-compatible proxy, cloakpipe start) that pseudonymizes personal data in arguments. It is an optional transform on calls the gate has already allowed, not the product.
Where to go next
- Quick start: run the support-agent example and watch the gate refuse the injected email.
- MCP tool gate: every flag, the decision order and the refusal codes.
- Integrations: put the gate in front of a server in Claude Code, Cursor or Codex.
- Approvals: have a person approve a held call through an approval broker v0.14, or by hand.
- Alerts & events: tell a human about a refusal, by webhook, Slack, Discord or OpenTelemetry v0.13.
- Comparison: how CloakPipe differs from other agent governance tools.